(Specially for the Radio Liberty project “Crimea Realities”)
The conquest of Crimea by Russia in 1783 still attracts the attention of politicians, journalists and even Elon Musk. Antiquarians know that this was the finale of a long process that included Russian invasions of the peninsula led by Dolgoruky, Lassi, Minikh and Golitsyn. And only professional historians know that the first attempt to seize Crimea was made 200 years before Catherine II – by the first Tsar of Moscow, Ivan the Terrible.
The struggle with the Great Horde, which was waged throughout the second half of the 15th century , forced the young Crimean Khanate to look for strong allies. Under Haji Gerai it was the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, under Mengli Gerai – the Ottoman Empire and the Moscow State. The Crimean-Moscow alliance turned out to be particularly strong and led to a serious strengthening of the positions of both partners in Eastern Europe.
In 1521, the Crimean army devastated Moscow – the era of long-term uncompromising enmity began
However, in 1502 the Great The Horde was finally defeated by Mengli Herai, which made Crimea its main heir, and at the same time made the alliance with Moscow meaningless. For some time, the old relations continued, but in 1507 Crimean attacks on Muscovite lands began, and in 1512 the Crimean-Lithuanian treaty was concluded. Ultimately, in 1521, the Crimean army devastated Moscow – the era of long-term uncompromising enmity began.
The Crimean-Moscow confrontation was based on several factors, one way or another tied to the Horde heritage. First, Crimea sought to protect itself from invasions from the Great Steppe, which could threaten its very existence. Since the khans did not have the strength to directly conquer all the former Horde possessions, they chose another path – alliances and symbolic domination. The Gerai positioned themselves as the most noble of all Chingizids in the region, so members of this family served as high officials at the courts of other khans (as in Haji-Tarkhan/Astrakhan) and even occupied the throne themselves (as in Kazan and Kasimov). . All the khanates maintained complete independence, but their recognition of the Herai supremacy was enough for the Crimea.
Moscow, on the other hand, was out of this schedule for a natural reason – it was not ruled by the Genghisids, but by the Rurikovs. Of course, no one recognized the seniority of this family outside of Muscovy, so their policy was focused on military supremacy. It was thanks to the strong army that Moscow managed to place its proteges on the thrones of Kazan and Astrakhan, even if the capture of the cities led to the growth of anti-Moscow sentiments among the people. This “tug of war” lasted almost a century.
Secondly, the increase of the economic base in the agrarian era was directly related to the growth of the controlled territory: for farmers – under arable land, for herders – under pasture. Therefore, the Great Steppe, suitable for both the former and the latter, inevitably became the arena of struggle between settled Slavic colonists and nomadic Turks. Formal power over these lands belonged to Crimea – it was not for nothing that at the beginning of the 16th century, the right bank of the Volga was called the “Crimean side”, but Muscovy gradually built new cities in the south, moving the border, and the Don Cossacks paid little attention to Crimea's claims. As a result, for almost three centuries, a bloody struggle raged here not only for horse herds, but also for captives.
In the middle of the 16th century, the confrontation escalated to a maximum. In 1547, the Moscow sovereign Ivan IV officially declared himself tsar, which had far-reaching consequences for his policy in the West and in the East. The title of tsar was used in the annals of the time to refer to the Golden Horde khans (and later other khanates), Roman, Byzantine, and German emperors (as well as biblical rulers). Thus, young Ivan claimed equality with the most important rulers of the era. And since most empires at that time defended the exclusivity of their status, the new title was not recognized by a number of states in Europe, in particular Crimea. The struggle for the inclusion of the “tsar” by foreigners in the official document circulation was waged by all available means, including with the help of war.
The Crimean Khan destroyed the Great Horde, so he was the «senior» among other khans, not a Muscovite. And they were not going to share seniority in Crimea
For Crimea, the rejection of such a title had an additional reason – Ivan IV placed himself above “ordinary” kings, claiming the status of German emperor and Ottoman sultan. And also – in this case it is implicit, but the analogy was palpable – to the status of the Mongol khan, who was the khan over the khans (Great Khan or Khakan/Khagan). In the eyes of the Crimea, Muscovy was the same ordinary Mongolian ulus that gained independence, like other states in the Volga region or Siberia. And the Moscow ruler could claim only to raise his status from “bey” to “khan”, but no more. After all, it was the Crimean khan who destroyed the Great Horde, so he was the “senior” among the other khans, not a Muscovite. And they were not going to share seniority in Crimea.
It should not be thought that titling is a matter of the individual ambitions of the ruler. In the pre-modern era, when states existed not so much by themselves, but as appendages to the ruler's personality/lineage, the title was one of the most important attributes of international status. And the higher a person climbed the hierarchical ladder, the freer he became in his actions. In this sense, the acquisition (and recognition!) of the title of emperor meant the acquisition of truly absolute power, with which the neighbors had to agree. Therefore, the question of whether the Crimean khan should be considered the “eldest” in Eastern Europe, or whether the Moscow ruler should be called the tsar, went far beyond the boundaries of finding out in correspondence who was “younger brother” to whom. It was a question of under whose banners the other rulers of the region would rally. And it was possible to fight for it.
The conflict was simply inevitable
Thus, not just two states collided in Eastern Europe, but two geopolitical models, each of which denied the other. Crimea needed an “umbrella” model, even wider than a confederation – with full independence of subjects while recognizing the symbolic supremacy of the Herai. Moscow, on the other hand, had to be satisfied with the classic imperial model, based on military force and only occasionally on diplomacy. Therefore, the conflict was simply inevitable.
In the 1550s, Ivan IV managed to achieve remarkable successes. Having abandoned the strategy of supporting loyal khans, he bet on the complete subjugation of the Volga khanates – and won. Kazan finally fell in 1552, Astrakhan in 1556. The militant Crimean khan Devlet Heray twice engaged in open war with the tsar for his neighbors, and also provided indirect assistance to the Astrakhans, but he was unable to change anything.